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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 11, 1983

83-0951

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Vice President's Visit to Europe and Followup

It is important that we do not lose the positive thrust of the Vice President's visit by actions here that would give contrary signals to the Europeans. It is particularly important that we build on this positive base at least through March 6, date of the German elections.

I have just learned that there is a possibility of an overall foreign policy speech that is planned for the President tentatively before an audience of American Legionaires.

I think this would be most inappropriate at this time.

The President can not make a speech of this type without using a part of the speech to discuss our defense and military capacity. While obviously this must be discussed at some time, doing it prior to March 6 German elections will only cause European press to focus on that part of the message that relates to "hardware" at the expense the reassurring part about arms reluction.

It would be another example of our giving mixed signals...a major part of our current problem with people in Europe. An audience composed of former military people is also inappropriate at this time...for the same reason.

RECOMMENDATION

However, we strongly recommend that the President followup the Vice President's visit with a short, clear, speech outlining American policy on arms reduction. It is needed to reemphasize the Vice President's trip. It is needed to clearly position the President as the leader in seeking world peace.



1. Strategic Arms Reduction. The President is the first world leader to address the arms issue with a meaningful and positive program to reduce arms. Proposals by other world leaders have dealt with limiting arms or controlling them.

The President should emphasize his leadership and his role in beginning the strategic arms reduction talks. He has proposed a 25% reduction in strategic arms. This is a very important fact, and one that is not well known by the public, in the United States and in Europe.

This proposal undercuts the previous nuclear freeze movement and we should make this point strongly in view of their coming demonstration in Washington on March 7 and 8..

2. Elimination of Intermediate Range Weapons. Following on the theme of identifying the President as the initiator of strategic arms reduction explain the President's proposal to rid Europe of an entire category of weapons (the INF proposals).

This initiative also completely undercuts the Freeze Movement

- . Perhaps wonder could be expressed that peace groups and the freeze movement are noticeably absent from support of this issue which goes far beyond their current propositions. Why?
- 3. Excess Capacity? The truth, less megatonnage than 10 years ago. The President should point out the fact that in strategic arms megatonnage the United States has substantially less nuclear weapons today than it had 15 years ago, and continues to reduce its excess capacity continually, maintaining only what is necessary for defense.

This would help overcome the feeling of many people that we constantly add more and who are not aware that the size of the deterent is substantially less than it has been in the past.

4. Positive Gesture. As a gesture of his continuing desire to reduce nuclear weaponry, the President's speech should announce his commitment to remove 1,000 nuclear shells from Europe this year.

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In summary the speech should be short, 10-15 simple, clear in its statement in the President' goals in arms reduction and under no circumstar with any of our defense posture. I.E., menticany other weapons system of that nature.

The speech should be delievered prior to March 6, German elections, and it should be delivered before an authat would be appropriate.

It has been suggested that the Washington Diplomatic Corps would be appropriate, I would endorse this. Alternatively he could speak to a young audience..e.g. university. That would demonstrate that we want public support for our policy and indicate the President's commitment to build a future of peace and security.

<u>Conclusion</u> . We should do nothing to undercut the positive momentum of the Vice President.

One of our problems in the past has been conflicting signals to Europeans which cancel out or confuse our messages and are creating increasing creditably problems about our true positions.

At this point in time Europe does not need to have its views about our military capacity reassured. It is our commitment to arms reduction, our sincerity to achieve that and our commitment to European Community and its Alliance which must be enhanced.

Ambassador Peter H. Dailey, Chairman European Public Diplomacy Committee

co: USIA-Mr. Wick
STATE-Mr. Eagleburger